

530-6.010 Part

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UNOFFICIAL COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS OF OPC MEMBERS OF AD HOC COMMITTEE

Our difficulty with the attachments to the memorandum proposed for Mr. Dulles' signature stems from the treatment of the issue described in the attachments as follows:

"Under one view the Psychological Strategy Board and its Staff would emphasize the function of coordination among existing agencies. Under another view the Psychological Strategy Board and its Staff would itself systematically plan and direct the psychological strategy of the 'cold' war."

In disagreeing over this issue the majority of the ad hoc group felt that it might be deferred until after the appointment of the Director. Although we would be perfectly content to have the question deferred until the Director is appointed, we do not believe that this is the action which the majority has taken. As we read the attachments, they require the Staff to be coordinators rather than planners, and we are fearful that the adoption of these terms of reference in their present form might well jeopardize the Director's ability to conceive of his functions as being otherwise.

The President's directive indicates that he intended that the Psychological Strategy Board be more than a coordinating mechanism. In our view, the Board is expected to define the objectives which this country should seek in the "cold" war situation, to develop the plans for attaining them, and to coordinate the carrying out of the plans by the responsible operating agencies. Thus, the purpose of his directive is "to authorize and provide for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations." The Board is responsible "for the formulation and promulgation of overall psychological objectives, policies, and programs and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort," which is defined as including "all activities (other than overt types of economic warfare) envisioned under NSC 59/1 and 10/2."

The President's directive thus notes in effect that the weaknesses in our "cold" war effort are our lack of well-defined national objectives (below the NSC level) and our lack of an overall strategic plan for the achievement of these objectives. We feel, therefore, that the Board and its Staff should concentrate its efforts from the outset in the satisfaction of these requirements and that its organization papers should reflect this priority.

Document No. _____

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

- ☐ CIA has no objection to declass
☒ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS S **(C)**
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Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100140015-6

Date 28 JUNE 82 Reviewer 103430

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Our recommendations as to the language in the attachments are based on this concept of the Board's purpose and on the assumption that the Board's Staff must play a principal part in assisting the Board to accomplish that purpose.

TAB B

- a. We suggest the addition of the following subparagraphs a, b, and c:

"a. On the basis of existing intelligence, to conduct an intensive and continuing investigation of the vulnerabilities of the present Soviet regime to attack; *we have intelligence.*

"b. Propose to the Board the objectives which can be attained by the United States in the "cold" war situation through the use of overt-covert weapons;

"c. Propose the general lines of action to be followed by the United States in the use of such weapons for the attainment of these objectives; recommend the allocation of operational responsibilities where these are not now established or in such cases where the transfer of responsibility will lie in the national interest."

- b. Substitute the following for subparagraph g:

"To investigate the possibilities of developing new and of improving present overt-covert weapons and techniques, and to arrange for the conduct by responsible departments and agencies of such research and development as is found necessary."

- c. Add new subparagraph:

"To consult with those Departments and Agencies responsible for the conduct of overt types of economic warfare to the end that US objectives, plans, and policies in this field be consistent with the objectives, plans, and policies adopted by PSB."

- d. The first task of the Staff should be that of reviewing the current situation and then of formulating strategic objectives and plans. If we do not start with this we will continue indefinitely on an ad hoc approach. This priority should be reflected in the chart of "Proposed Organization - Phase II" by indicating the immediate creation of a

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Plans Group and its activation prior to that of the operational coordination and programming and evaluation group shown on the chart. The Staff Director should have the authority to staff this group with individuals who are now employed by the Federal Government, as well as consultants, and the member departments and agencies should place a very high priority on assisting the director immediately to obtain the very best talent available.

- e. Note (1) authorizes the appointment of deputies to the Board membership. Although this is desirable and although, as stated in the note, the departmental responsibilities of such deputies should by all means be as broad as the scope of the Board's responsibilities, it is essential that the Board's business not be turned over to the deputies. In order to avoid this, we suggest deleting the second sentence of the note and substituting the following:

"For the purposes of a quorum, at least two of the Board's members must be present. In the absence of the Chairman, the Director will act as chairman."

what is?

TAB D

It is obvious from our previous comments that in our view the first task of the Board and its Staff is to set our "cold" war objectives and develop an initial strategy towards them which will encompass an integrated use of all available "cold" war weapons. Consequently, we suggest placing these two problems at the top of the Board's agenda. Since it is likely that the best solutions to other items presently on the agenda will be found only after the objectives and general overall strategy towards them have been adopted, we also suggest deferring these other items for the time being, during which they can be handled as at present.

Although we feel that the treatment of "psychological strategy in the 'cold' war" which appears in the annex is again too heavily weighted on the propaganda side, we think that the concept of a working group, composed as suggested, which would meet outside of Washington during the summer, is excellent. We suggest that this group be organized early in the summer and be asked to assist the Director and his Staff in preparing for the Board the statement of objectives and the broad strategy towards them, which we have referred to several times elsewhere.

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